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Decision making by health care professionals is often complicated by
the need to integrate ill-structured, uncertain, and potentially conflicting
information from various sources. In this paper cognitive approaches
to the study of decision making are presented within the context of a
variety of complex health care applications. In recent years it has
become increasingly accepted that in order to build information systems
that can support complex decision making it will be necessary to more
fully understand human decision-making processes. Methodological
approaches are described that aim to explicate the decision making
and reasoning skills of subjects as they perform activities involving
the processing of complex information. The paper begins by presenting
the theoretical foundations for cognitive analyses of decision making,
including discussion of major approaches to the study of decision
making in a range of real-world domains, including medicine. Applica-
tions of cognitive approaches are then illustrated, including a descrip-
tion of a study in which subjects were asked to “think aloud” in
providing treatment decisions for complex medical cases. The resulting
protocols were then analyzed for subjects’ use of decision strategies
and problems in reasoning. Extension of cognitive approaches to the
study of group decision-making processes is also described. Recent
approaches are discussed which borrow from advances in the study
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All rights reserved.of human–computer interaction and which utilize video analysis of
decision-making activities involving information technologies. Using
these approaches it has been found that health care information systems,
such as computerized patient record systems, may have inadvertent
effects on human decision making. Implications of a cognitive approach
to improving our understanding of complex decision making are dis-Key Words: decision making; problem solving; medical cognition;
health informatics; cognitive science; cognitive task analysis; technol-
ogy evaluation; usability engineering; decision support systems; health
information systems.1. INTRODUCTION
It has become increasingly accepted that emphasis needs
to be placed in health informatics on understanding the cog-
nitive processes involved in complex health care. A variety
evidence. However, the extent to which such differences
apply across broad levels of expertise has remained to be366
of approaches to characterizing complex health care decision
making have been applied in the design and evaluation of
health care information systems, ranging from decision sup-
port systems to computerized patient record systems [1]. An
improved understanding of cognition will be essential both
for evaluating the effects of such systems and for providing
input into their iterative development. It has also been argued
that an inherent mismatch between the way humans and
computers process information may have potentially detri-
mental effects upon decision making among health care
professionals, necessitating improved understanding of com-
plex decision making [2]. Such understanding may be essen-
tial for designing computer systems that are capable of effec-
tively supporting human decision processes. This paper
examines a number of cognitive frameworks as well as spe-
cific methodologies used in understanding complex health
care decision making.
Decision making in complex domains can be considered
to be a function of the decision task and the expertise of the
decision maker. In general, under conditions of high task
complexity, heuristic strategies are likely to be applied by
decision makers to simplify the decision problem [3, 4]. As
decisions become more complex and the available informa-
tion leads to potentially ambiguous and contradictory inter-
pretations, simplifying strategies may be required to allow
the decision maker to act with confidence. For example,
high-performance decision making in situations such as fire
fighting and telephone triage has been found to be closely
related to overall strategies used for interpreting the state of
the emergency [5, 6]. In situations typical of emergency and
intensive care medicine, there may be a large number of
possible interpretations of patient problems, coupled with a
lack of clearly defined “gold standards” for choice of action
[7]. Constraining decision problems under such circum-
stances may be extremely difficult and specific strategies
selected would be expected to vary according to the expertise
of the decision maker.
Making decisions in health care is often complicated by
factors such as ambiguity of information, varying interpreta-
tions of evidence, and the multiple perspectives and back-
grounds of decision makers. These conditions are character-
istic of decision making occurring daily in the health care
setting. This paper will focus on the approaches and strate-
gies used by subjects of varying levels of expertise in coping
with such situations. Decision making becomes complex in
the presence of discrepancies or anomalous data that appear
to contradict the overall patient presentation or the presumed
diagnostic hypothesis [8]. This leads to possibly divergent
interpretations of the patient’s state. An understanding of
the conditions under which different types of strategies areANDRE W. KUSHNIRUK
employed by decision makers to cope with such complex
problems is essential to provide a strong foundation for
building computer systems to support the decision making
of novice through to expert health care workers.
In medicine, the processing of complex data is at the heart
of decision making. Strategies for dealing with decision
complexity have been found to distinguish experts from
nonexperts [9]. Research in the study of medical cognition,
as well as in other domains, has indicated that: (a) experts
have highly organized knowledge structures, (b) they do not
process irrelevant information, and (c) they apply specific
knowledge-based problem-solving strategies in dealing with
routine cases [10]. Previous work in medicine has shown
that the structure of the decision task, including the presence
of noncritical cues, affects reasoning patterns of expert deci-
sion makers [11]. It has also been found that medical students
of differing levels of experience apply different strategies for
dealing with contradictory evidence. For example, Arocha et
al. [12] found that beginning students may ignore or reinter-
pret anomalous evidence, while more experienced students
consider concurrent hypotheses to account for contradictorymore fully examined and has implications for development
of computer-based information systems which will provide
context-sensitive support and training, customized to the
level of the end user and sensitive to the type of problems
encountered in complex decision situations.
2. COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO STUDYING
COMPLEX DECISION MAKING
In this section of the paper a number of methodological
and theoretical issues in the study of complex decision mak-
ing are discussed. The concept of a cognitive continuum is
introduced for characterizing decision making and the role
of expertise is explored, as well as a number of current
issues in the cognitive study of complex decision making.
Methodological IssuesAlthough conceptually similar, medical problem solving
and decision making have traditionally been studied using
different research approaches. Psychological research in de-
cision making has often focused on the “decision event,” a
hypothesized point in time when a decision maker weighs
alternatives and chooses a course of action [13]. Although
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closely related, as will be described in the next section, the
study of medical problem solving has focused on processes
that often precede the decision event, e.g., generation of
diagnostic hypotheses and overall situational assessment.
Over the past several decades, a considerable body of re-
search findings has accumulated in the cognitive study of
medical problem solving [9]. Studies have indicated that
physicians use a variety of strategies in dealing with uncer-
tain and ill-structured medical problems [14, 15]. For exam-
ple, in solving diagnostic problems, expert physicians have
been shown to be capable of focusing on small sets of related
hypotheses and are able to use efficient discrimination strate-
gies for rapidly distinguishing relevant from irrelevant infor-
mation in diagnostic reasoning [16–18]. Furthermore, the
differences between expert processing may depend on the
nature of the task being performed, with highly visual areas
of expertise involving pattern perception, while other prob-
lem-solving domains may require more effortful analysis,
even by experts [19]. In the study of medical decision mak-
ing, greater focus has typically been placed on the analysis
of decision outcomes, using application of theoretical per-
spectives which have emerged from decision theory [20].
The extent to which theoretical frameworks emerging
from the study of medical problem solving and reasoning
can be extended to therapeutic decision making remains
to be clarified and provides motivation for recent work in
cognitive research in health care decision making. Expli-
cating the relation between areas which have traditionally
been considered the study of problem solving and the study
of decision making has remained a challenge. Problem-solv-
ing research has often focused on the processes by which
solutions are reached and how knowledge is used. In con-
trast, much of the large literature on decision making has
focused on the outcome of the “decision event,” described
above. However, a number of researchers have begun to
explore the relation between these literatures [21]. Along
these lines, it has been argued that methods applied in the
study of medical problem solving and reasoning can be
usefully applied to the study of therapeutic decision making,
thereby extending traditional analyses focusing on deci-
sion outcomes to include greater consideration of cognitive
processes underlying choice [22]. In the studies reported in
this paper, processes considered to be within the realm of
diagnostic reasoning and therapeutic decision making are
considered.
Research has also been conducted in the naturalistic study
of decision making in areas ranging from fire fighting to
intensive care medicine. Much of this work has employed
nonobtrusive observational study [6], or use of retrospective
reports in the analysis of decision making during critical367
incidents [13]. Some of the results of such study have chal-
lenged findings and conclusions drawn from the larger body
of traditional, laboratory-based research in decision making
which has grown out of a decision-theoretic perspective
[23]. For example, it has been argued that a focus of many
laboratory studies of decision making on the “decision
event” is not representative of many real-life decision prob-
lems which are often ill-structured and may require consider-
able problem-solving processes as a prelude to the develop-
ment or consideration of decision alternatives. Other
researchers have recently focused on the need to examine
the ecological validity of experimental tasks in studies of
decision making and problem solving [24].
The Cognitive Continuum in Complex Decision Making
In considering the relationship between decision making
and problem solving, decision making can be considered a
problem-solving process in which the solution is in the form
of a decision, typically leading to an action. Consistent with
this perspective, important links have been made between
research in decision making and related areas of study, such
as the study of complex problem solving. There has also been
a growing awareness that decision making and reasoning are
highly interrelated, although the literatures in these two areas
have been somewhat separate as well. For example, studies
of deductive reasoning have examined the process of how
humans move from premises to conclusions, where subjects
may be given premises of an argument and are then asked
if a conclusion follows from those premises. In contrast, a
typical task in the decision-making literature focuses on the
choices made by subjects between actions, with the choices
often presented to subjects. According to Johnson-Laird and
Shafir [21], there are a number of reasons for considering
the relation between decision making and reasoning. For
many purposes it may not be productive to strictly separate
the two when considering real-world problems, since in
everyday situations reasoning and decision making are often
highly interwoven, with decision making involving reason-
ing (i.e., the individual will have to reason in order to make
decisions) [25]. Along these lines, Cooper and Fox [22] have
argued that research in decision making needs to address to a
greater degree the role of cognitive factors, including human
memory limitations and specific subject strategies. It is fur-
ther argued that work is needed to bring methods from the
general area of cognitive psychology which routinely deal
with problem-solving processes and reasoning into the main-
stream study of decision making.
In considering complex decision making, Hammond [26]
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has argued that cognitive processes in decision making can
be located along a cognitive continuum, which ranges be-
tween intuition and analysis. Tasks that require the proc-
essing of large amounts of information in a very short time
period tend to induce intuitive (i.e., less analytical) proc-
essing. On the other hand, tasks that involve quantitative
information, presented in a sequential fashion may induce
more analytical processing. Other factors that affect where
a decision may fall on this continuum include the effects of
failure (e.g., the decision maker may tend to become more
analytical when intuitive judgments fail, or become more
intuitive when careful analysis fails), task complexity as
well as the experience and expertise of the decision maker.
For example, under conditions requiring a rapid response,
an expert’s decision making may fall more on the side of
intuition; i.e., based on prior experience, a decision may be
made without extensive conscious deliberation. According
to Hammond, it may be possible that cognitive activity in
decision making may move along the continuum during
complex problem solving, i.e., oscillate between intuition
and analysis [27, 28]. The cognitive continuum provides a
useful framework for considering a number of cognitive
models (described below) ranging from those focusing on
recognitional processes to models that emphasize processes
involving explanation and reasoning with evidence. It also
is consistent with models of skill acquisition, where skill in
performing a given task moves through stages of deliberate
and mindful practice until it eventually becomes auto-
mated [29].
At one end of the cognitive continuum a number of cogni-
tive models have appeared that focus on recognitional as-
pects of decision making in complex domains. A perspective
on decision making based on recognitional processes is con-
sistent with work from the study of expertise in problem
solving and reasoning. For example, work by Chase and
Simon [30] indicates that expert chess players are adept
at quickly recognizing arrangements of chess pieces from
previous games. In the area of medical diagnosis, Patel et
al. [17] found that expert physicians are adept at quickly
filtering out irrelevant information and focusing on relevant
cues in doctor–patient interactions. Other related findings
have emerged from the study of cognitive processes involved
in expert diagnosis involving radiographic images, where
experts were found to develop finely tuned mental represen-
tations of patient anatomy which drive the physicians’ per-
ception and allow them to rapidly recognize important fea-
tures in the image [16].
The Recognition-Primed Decision Making (RPD) modelANDRE W. KUSHNIRUK
[31] is a recent cognitive model which focuses on recogni-
tional processes in describing how critical decisions are
made by experienced decision makers. The area of research
from which the model was developed was the study of the
decision making of highly experienced urban fireground
commanders [13]. In considering analysis of retrospective
reports Klein and Calderwood found that experienced deci-
sion makers do not work out all possible contingencies but
rather develop a workable solution to decision problems
(consistent with Simon’s [32] conception of bounded ration-
ality): “It was difficult to represent the phenomenological
accounts of these decision processes in any meaningful way
within the decision tree framework. Indeed, the fireground
commanders resisted any attempt to characterize their roles
in terms of ‘making choices,’ ‘considering alternatives,’ or
‘assessing probabilities.”’ Klein and Calderwood go on to
state that the firefighters instead “saw themselves as acting
and reacting on the basis of prior experience, planning, moni-
toring, and modifying plans to meet specific constraints.”
As a consequence of findings from such studies, an emphasis
has recently emerged on the relation between decision-mak-
ing processes and aspects of problem solving, in particular
the role of problem representation and situation assessment
in skilled performance in professional domains, including
medicine [33].
Situation assessment refers to the identification and clari-
fication, by the decision maker, of the state of the decision
problem [34]. This includes identification of goals, the as-
sessment of how critical the problem is, and comparison of
the current state of the world to previous experience. Re-
search from a number of domains [6, 35, 36] has implicated
the importance of situation assessment, i.e. “sizing up” a
decision problem and understanding a situation in terms of its
similarity to previously encountered experiences. Situations
that are highly familiar to the decision maker may lead to
automatic response. On the other hand, situations that are
unfamiliar, or only moderately familiar to the decision
maker, may invoke analytical reasoning.
At the analytical end of the cognitive continuum are recent
models of decision making emphasizing the role that explan-
atory processes play in reasoning and decision making
[37–39]. From this perspective, reasoning about evidence
is viewed as a central process in complex decision making.
Using evidence, in conjunction with stored knowledge about
similar events, the decision maker attempts to develop a
coherent explanation, using schemata to guide construction
of a plausible story and to fill in missing information. Ac-
cording to explanation-based models, decision makers con-
struct summary representations of evidence, which are used
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as a basis for making decisions. These representations are
important in facilitating the active process of evidence com-
prehension, directing inferencing and ultimately reaching a
final decision. Pennington and Hastie [37] argue that differ-
ences in decision making by individuals of different levels
of experience lie largely in the evidence evaluation stage of
the decision process. These differences are reflected in the
structure of the explanations that they generate. Furthermore,
the structure of the causal model that is constructed to explain
evidence will be specific to the decision domain. For exam-
ple, according to Pennington and Hastie [37], physicians
construct an explanation of findings in terms of one or more
disease categories. In related work, Patel and Groen [9] have
found essential differences in the structure of pathophysio-
logical explanations of clinical cases given by subjects of
varying levels of medical expertise, with experts producing
explanations that are more coherent and that contain less
extraneous detail than explanations by nonexperts.
The Role of Expertise in Medical Reasoning and
Decision Making
In medicine, expertise can be considered to exist along a
continuum, ranging from novices (i.e., medical students), to
experts possessing highly specialized medical knowledge
[15]. Development of medical expertise appears to be
marked by transitions which reflect underlying reorganiza-
tions of knowledge and increases in mastery of domain tasks
[9]. Although the focus of much research is on the “expert,”
with novice performance being used for comparison, a
broader perspective encompasses an understanding of the
progression from novice to expert. Research in medical cog-
nition has provided support for findings of essential differ-
ences in the reasoning strategies and knowledge organization
of physicians of varying levels of expertise. For example,
Feltovich et al. [40] found that expert physicians possess
elaborate and highly structured knowledge bases capable of
supporting efficient reasoning. In a series of studies con-
ducted by Patel and colleagues, subjects of differing levels of
expertise were presented with short descriptions of medical
cases and were asked to provide explanations of the underly-
ing pathophysiology. Applying methods of propositional
analysis, Patel and Groen have characterized the reasoning
processes and strategies of novices and experts [9]. From
these studies [9, 41] it has been found that directionality of
reasoning is predictive of diagnostic accuracy, with experts
producing correct diagnoses typically using a forward rea-
soning strategy (i.e., from data to hypotheses). In contrast,369
nonexperts and experts outside of their domain who produce
incorrect diagnoses were found to use predominantly back-
ward reasoning (i.e., from hypotheses back to data); how-
ever, the two types of reasoning may become more mixed
as problem-solving tasks become more complex.
Although a large body of results has accumulated in the
study of medical cognition, the emphasis of the majority of
studies has been on diagnostic reasoning and problem solv-
ing (i.e., analyses of cognitive processes occurring prior to
treatment choice). Research examining treatment choices
and decision making regarding patient management has
more typically employed approaches which have emerged
from the traditional judgment and decision literature, with a
focus on subjective expected utilities and decision outcomes.
However, cognitive studies of therapeutic decision making
[20] indicate that a process-centered approach to the study
of decision making can also provide considerable insight
into understanding physicians’ decision-making strategies.
In one cognitive study of therapeutic decision making, Kuip-
ers et al. [42] presented three pulmonary physicians with
a case description involving a patient with a pulmonary
condition. Verbal protocols were collected of the physicians’
responses to the cases as they provided treatment decisions.
Kuipers and colleagues [42] found that the process of physi-
cian decision making “resembled an incremental, sequential-
refinement planning algorithm, where a complex decision
is broken into a sequence of choices to be made with a
simplified description of the alternatives.” Based on protocol
analysis, Kuipers and colleagues argue that medical deci-
sions are not made after gathering all the facts, but are
instead constructed (through an incremental planning proc-
ess, allowing complex medical problems to be solved with
limited processing resources).
In line with a trend toward studying reasoning, problem
solving, and decision making in realistic tasks and real-
world contexts [31], research has been conducted involving
analysis of decision making by teams of physicians and
nurses in critical health care settings, such as the intensive
care unit [43] and the operating room [33]. In other naturalis-
tic studies, decision-making strategies in emergency tele-
phone triage situations have been examined, focusing on
assessing the relationship between decision-making strate-
gies and the underlying knowledge of the decision maker.
For example, Leprohon and Patel [6] found that in high-
urgency situations, nurses use simple rules that often lead
to accurate decisions (which however often do not corre-
spond to their retrospective explanations of their actions).
In moderate- to low-urgency conditions, accuracy in the
involved in complex decision making to the development
of improved decision support systems needs to more fully370
development of plans of action is related to the nurses’
ability to assess the overall state of the emergency situation.
Issues in the Cognitive Study of Complex Medical
Decision Making
A number of issues remain as challenges to research in
medical decision making. In particular, work is needed in
understanding the relationship between results and empirical
findings from the study of medical problem solving with
those from research in therapeutic decision making. The
question remains as to what extent findings from the study
of problem solving and reasoning apply or are different from
those that relate to therapeutic decision making. Another
area that warrants investigation is that of the relation of
findings emerging from recent study of decision making in
naturalistic settings, typically involving observational meth-
ods or retrospective reports (e.g., the work of Klein [31]
and Patel et al. [43]) with results obtained from experimental
laboratory-based studies. Some researchers have considered
the naturalistic approach to represent a new paradigm in the
study of decision making (e.g., Orasanu and Connolly [44],
and Cannon-Bowers et al. [45]) that strongly challenges the
results from more traditional psychological and cognitive
studies [13]. However, as indicated in this Review, there
may be a number of parallels and consistencies among find-
ings from both naturalistic and experimental studies. The
extent to which such parallels hold is an area that requires
further study and which has considerable implications for
future directions in the study of decision making and problem
solving in general.
Decision making in medicine typically requires the inte-
gration of complex evidence from a variety of sources. This
evidence may be conflicting or lead to ambiguous interpreta-
tion of a patient’s state. Differences in approaches to dealing
with conflicting and anomalous data have been found in
a number of domains, ranging from education and theory
formulation in science [46, 47] to medical diagnosis [15].
Understanding how experts as well as nonexperts deal with
medical cases that contain anomalous evidence is of great
importance in characterizing the role of expertise in medical
decision making. For example, studies have shown that ex-
perts may switch from forward-reasoning to backward-rea-
soning strategies depending on the complexity of the deci-
sion task. It has been found that when “loose ends,” i.e.,
anomalous data not directly related to the main diagnosis,
are included in a case, the expert’s pattern of forward reason-
ing may be disrupted [11]. The nature of the decision task,
including its difficulty, the extent to which the task is nonrou-
tine, and the level of ambiguity of evidence, are all factorsANDRE W. KUSHNIRUK
which have remained to be more fully explored when consid-
ering differences in expert and novice decision strategies.
Although findings have emerged indicating essential differ-
ences in the reasoning and decision-making processes of
experts and nonexperts, work is needed in elucidating the
conditions under which such differences appear, particularly
the effect of complexity of evidence on decision strategies.
Finally, the relation of research investigating processesexplored. It has been argued [1] that in order to provide
decision support to health care workers that is both sensitive
to the type of problems that occur in real situations and also
sensitive to their background and expertise, cognitive studies
of decision making will be essential.
3. APPLICATION OF COGNITIVE METHODS TO
THE ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH INFORMATICS
Despite the considerable amount of effort and research
that has gone into the development of high-level decision
support systems for use in health care, these systems have
yet to penetrate deeply into practical day-to-day medical
use [48]. Some researchers have argued for more extensive
clinical evaluations of existing systems [49], while others
have argued that the process of decision support development
itself needs to be critically reexamined [50]. It has recently
been argued that more work is needed in developing and
refining appropriate methods for analyzing complex clinical
problems and situations and determining how physicians
cope when faced with difficult medical cases [1]. In the
remainder of this paper we discuss a number of methodologi-
cal approaches to the study of such complex health care
decision making which have grown out of the theoretical
frameworks discussed in the first part of the paper.
Cognitive Task Analysis
An important approach which has emerged over the past
two decades and which has led to a number of powerful
methods for assessing processes involved in complex deci-
sion making (along the entire cognitive continuum described
in the previous section) is known as cognitive task analysis.
In contrast to traditional approaches to the study of decision
making which focus on the “decision event” (a hypothesized
point in time when the decision maker is supposed to weigh
which varied in terms of clinical and lung scan evidence forANALYSIS OF COMPLEX DECISION MAKING PROCESSES
alternatives and arrive at a decision), cognitive task analysis
aims to explicate the cognitive processes that occur both
prior to and during complex decision making. In addition,
cognitive task analysis aims to take into account the complex
situational factors that affect decision making as well as the
effects of prior knowledge and expertise brought to bear on
decision making by the decision maker [51].
The term “cognitive task analysis” first appeared around
1980 and has drawn on a number of research streams [51]
including the following:
1. The study of expertise in the study of problem solving
as a basis for development of computer-based intelligent
tutoring systems [52].
2. Extension of usability engineering to study of complex
real-world problem solving as basis for “cognitive” system
engineering [53].
3. Study of human–computer interaction focusing on
analysis of the process of computer use [54].
4. Ethnographic study of workplaces as “cultures” and
the effects of introduction of technology [55].
5. Naturalistic research involving observational study and
use of retrospective reports by decision makers in real-world
areas such as fire fighting and medicine [13].
Although the methods applied in cognitive task analysis
vary, as the list of research streams given above might imply,
there are a number of common threads to such approaches
[56]. These include an emphasis on understanding the proc-
esses involved in complex decision making and reasoning,
which is in contrast to much of the traditional work in
decision making and medical informatics, where the focus
has been less on understanding complex cognitive processes
and more on assessment of decision outcomes. Second, the
approaches attempt to take into account and characterize
the effects of experience and prior knowledge on decision
processes, which also contrasts to much of the traditional
normative research in areas including the psychological
study of decision making. Finally, the approaches typically
identify problems that occur in decision making and reason-
ing (with or without using technology) by subjects of varying
levels of expertise. A number of these methods provide a
framework for studying complex health care decision mak-
ing and for providing practical input into the selection and
design of health care decision support systems. Several ex-
amples of particular application of such methods will be
described in the remainder of this paper.371
Cognitive Task Analysis of Complex Decision Making in
Intensive Care
In this section, we provide an example of application of
cognitive task analysis to studying the processes involved
in complex decision making in intensive care medicine [1].
The study we will use to illustrate the overall approach
involved the examination of decision making by medical
students and physicians in dealing with pulmonary embolism
(PE), a condition frequently encountered in intensive care
medicine. PE is a respiratory complication typically arising
from blood clots originating in the deep veins of the legs
and eventually leading to the obstruction of the pulmonary
arteries, respiratory compromise, and potentially death. Both
the diagnosis and treatment of PE may be extremely complex
from a cognitive point of view, requiring the weighing of
evidence from the patients’ overall clinical presentation as
well as evidence from specific tests and scans. In conducting
this study it was believed that these types of conditions which
complicate decision making are typical of many decision
situations in health care. PE is commonly encountered, and
yet the symptom presentation is complex and there are many
nuances to its diagnosis and treatment.
In conducting the study, task materials were developed
(with the aid of an expert physician) that provided descrip-
tions of patients with varying degrees of evidence for pulmo-
nary embolism. Based on an initial investigation of physi-
cians’ diagnosis of this condition it was found that clinical
evidence for PE is typically weighed in conjunction with
results of a lung scan. Twelve written cases were designedthe condition—i.e., two cases were developed for each of
six types of cases representing combinations of three levels
of PE probability based on lung scan results (low, intermedi-
ate and high probability of PE) with two combinations of
clinical evidence (low and high probability of PE)—see
Table 1. Some of the cases represented consistent evidence
TABLE 1
Case Types Developed for Cognitive Task Analysis of Decision
Making
Case Probability lung scan for Clinical evidence for








for PE (e.g., cases characterized by high clinical evidence
for PE in conjunction with a high probability lung scan),
while other cases represented varying degrees of conflicting
information (e.g., high clinical evidence for PE in conjunc-
tion with an lung scan indicating a low probability of PE).
Subjects who participated in the study included eight med-
ical students (novice subjects), eight residents (intermediate
level subjects), and eight intensive care specialists (expert
subjects). During the data collection, each subject was pre-
sented with the 12 cases one at a time and was asked to
read the case and “think aloud” in deciding on a course
of action for each patient case. The resulting think-aloud
protocols were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim for anal-
ysis of decision strategies and problems in decision making.
In order to analyze the transcribed protocols a coding scheme
was developed to identify decision processes and reasoning
strategies used. This included identification of choice of
treatments, generation of diagnostic hypotheses as well as
requests for information and processes involved in arriving
at a situation assessment (see [36] for details).
In summary, the findings indicated general differences in
strategies for dealing with ambiguity of evidence across
subjects of differing levels of expertise. In particular, when
faced with a clinical picture which was in contrast to lung
scan results (e.g., high clinical evidence for PE in conjunc-
tion with a lung scan indicating a low probability of PE),
the medical students tended to base their decisions on the
results of the scan results. In contrast, the expert physicians
were much more likely to reject an anomalous piece of
evidence (e.g., a low probability lung scan) in favor of the
overall clinical pictures. Intermediate-level subjects (resi-
dents) dealt with such conflicting evidence by attempting
to defer the decision if possible. A second finding which
emerged from the analysis of the think-aloud protocols was
that expert physicians focused on developing a strong situa-
tion assessment for each case, from which they were then
able to interpret individual pieces of data. In general expert
subjects stated they would require further detailed situational
information and generated significantly fewer diagnostic
hypotheses, investigations, and treatments than intermediate
(resident) subjects.This type of research has a number of implications for
the design of computer-based information systems to support
human cognitive processing and information needs [1, 36].
Along related lines, it has been argued that a closer relation-
ship should be developed between design of such systems
and cognitive research in medical reasoning and decision
making. Although improved computer-based support ofANDRE W. KUSHNIRUK
complex decision making will require a greater understand-
ing of the cognitive processes of potential users of such
systems, the identification and extraction of knowledge
needed for developing decision support that adequately
meets the cognitive needs of users has proven to be a formi-
dable challenge. In this paper, it is argued that in-depth
cognitive analysis of medical decision making in domains
targeted for decision support may be necessary where prob-
lem complexity makes conventional systems analysis and
knowledge acquisition techniques inadequate. For example,
in many complex medical domains (including much of inten-
sive care and emergency medicine) physicians are often not
consciously aware of how they cope with decision complex-
ity, their strategies for dealing with uncertain and ill-defined
problems, and how factors such as experience and expertise
affect their decision making and those of their co-workers.
In such contexts, scientific approaches to analyzing decision
strategies and identifying heuristics, using methodological
approaches such as cognitive task analysis, can be used to
assess how complex decisions are handled and how knowl-
edge-based decision support systems can be designed to
facilitate and enhance the decision making of users of vary-
ing levels of expertise.
The importance of having an improved understanding of
cognitive processes in complex domains such as medicine
includes development of a sound basis for strategically tar-
geting computer systems to provide assistance with decision-
making tasks and processes that humans find difficult or
error prone. Furthermore, in order to develop knowledge-
based decision support systems that can provide flexible,
context-sensitive support for health workers (of varying lev-
els of expertise and training), methodologies for understand-
ing and characterizing differences in reasoning and decision
making are needed. Specifically to assist human decision
processes, extensions of the cognitive approaches presented
in this paper can be applied in characterizing the following
attributes of decision making: (a) the skills that decision
makers need to bring to bear on the decision-making process,
(b) the strategies actually used by subjects of varying levels
of expertise in coping with complexity and specific con-
straints in decision making, and (c) the types of problems
encountered by subjects of varying levels of expertise—
essential for identifying the problems areas that arise which
need to be supported and identifying the nature of effective
support for cognitive processing (e.g., including extending
the range of strategies the decision maker may be aware of,
and providing specific assistance in aspects of decision-
making processing, such as situational assessment).
theoretical and methodological frameworks from the study
of individual decision making (as in the study of decisionANALYSIS OF COMPLEX DECISION MAKING PROCESSES
Extension of a Cognitive Task Analysis Approach to Study
of Physician–Computer Interactions during Health
Care Decision Making
As described above, one approach to the study of complex
decision making involves the recording of subjects (i.e.,
health care workers) as they “think aloud” while making
complex decisions. In a series of studies investigating the
effects of the use of information technology on health care
decision making, a similar approach was extended to include
full video recording of physicians interactions with informa-
tion systems as they (a) thought aloud while using a patient
information system in diagnostic reasoning and (b) inter-
viewed patients while at the same time entering information
into a patient record system. The techniques for conducting
such studies have involved integration of methods from the
emerging area of usability engineering [36, 57, 58] to the
study of health care decision making mediated by advanced
information technologies. The approach to recording the
cognitive processes and interactions of physicians with pa-
tients in real health care contexts also borrows from cognitive
task analysis with its emphasis on recording of processes
involved in complex decision-making situations.
In a number of studies applying such hybrid methodolo-
gies, we have found that the organization of information as
it is presented on the computer screens of systems (e.g.,
electronic patient records and decision support systems) can
greatly influence the physicians’ reasoning processes and
patterns. In some cases specific screen arrangements can
greatly affect the direction of the physicians’ information
gathering when attempting to arrive at a diagnosis or treat-
ment plan—an effect which we have termed “screen-driven”
diagnostic behavior [59]. Current work along these lines has
included application of cognitive task analysis methods in
the distance evaluation of use of information systems over
the World Wide Web [60].
From Individual to Group Decision Making: Application
of Cognitive Task Analysis in the Study of
Collaborative Decision Making
In another line of research, theoretical frameworks and
methods emerging from the study of individual decision
makers in health care are being extended to studies involving
group and team decision making. For example, we have
recently conducted studies of the communication among
nurses and physicians in an intensive care unit [61]. Two
groups of subjects, consisting of nurses in an intensive care
unit, and a second group consisting of physicians in that unit,373
met in a series of meetings to discuss problems occurring
in an ICU (too many blood gas analyses). The sessions were
conducted as problem-solving sessions with the discussion
being audio and video recorded as the groups identified
problems and suggested solutions to those problems in the
unit. Extending the approach to coding and analysis of indi-
vidual decision strategies, described above in relation to the
study of intensive care decision making, the group meetings
were coded and analyzed to identify hypotheses proposed (as
to organizational problems), evidence provided in support of
arguments, and proposed solutions. The results indicated a
convergence of identified problems and solutions and has
since been used to feedback into the optimization of the
ICU under study.
An area of research of considerable relevance to health
care is emerging from the study of human–computer interac-
tion and team decision making [62, 63]. Much of this work
has suggested that there may be important parallels between
theoretical frameworks and potentially among methodolo-
gies used for study of individual decision making and that
of groups. Indeed, specific aspects of team decision making,
including the group’s use of simplifying strategies in dealing
with complex cases, can be considered in the context of
theoretical frameworks which have emerged in the study of
individual decision making. We are currently undertaking
research studying group decision making in medical educa-
tion involving the video recording of small group teaching
sessions. This research aims to determine the extent to whichmaking involving pulmonary embolism described above)
apply to the study of group decision making and the extent
to which an understanding of group decision making can
form the basis for selection and design of group decision
support systems.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In recent years it has become apparent that the design of
computer systems in medicine needs to take understanding
of how physicians of varying levels of experience process
medical information and make difficult decisions into greater
consideration. This is especially relevant in the area of de-
signing decision support systems to facilitate and support
the higher level decision making processes of users ranging
from novices to intermediates to experts. Despite the consid-
erable amount of effort and research that has previously
in writing this article. I also thank my colleagues from the Centre for374
gone into the development of computerized expert systems
and knowledge-based medical decision support systems,
these systems have not penetrated deeply into practical day-
to-day medical use [48]. It has been argued that research in
decision support in general has focused on incorporating
the latest of information technology while paying far less
attention to whether these new support systems are compati-
ble with the psychology and needs of decision makers in
their day-to-day practice [64]. Along these lines, it has also
been argued that there is often a fundamental mismatch
between the way humans process information during deci-
sion making and the way it is processed by computers.
Knowledge of how information is processed by decision
makers of varying levels of expertise may be critical in the
development of effective decision support tools in providing
relevant and up-to-date support for actual application in
daily situations. An improved understanding of the cognitive
processes of health care workers will be critical to the success
of such technology in actually changing and improving prac-
tice. Along these lines, a distinction can be made between
merely automating a process and changing a process in a
way that is useful. If a change is perceived by health care
workers as being useful, it will more likely be accepted and
lead to improved practice. Such work will be needed to
form the basis for the development of information retrieval
systems designed to provide users with context-sensitive
help and automated retrieval of information resources rele-
vant to the needs of health care workers. In addition, research
into assessing the effects of health care information systems
on reasoning and decision making will be essential, particu-
larly as it has been shown that small changes in the design
of the user interfaces of such systems can potentially have
dramatic impact on physician decision making processes
[59].
From the review of literature presented in this paper it is
clear that there are a growing number of trends and develop-
ments in the study of complex decision making that have
considerable significance for understanding health care deci-
sion making as well as for potentially improving it. In conclu-
sion, cognitive approaches to the study of decision making
may provide a sound basis for understanding the strategies
and problems encountered by decision makers.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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